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INTRODUCTION
In Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Reli-
gious Freedom, Professor Steven D. Smith presents the most pessimistic
account of judicial attempts to police the boundary between the gar-
den of religious belief and the wilderness of the secular state.2 Profes-
sor Smith concludes that in Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause cases,3 courts cannot develop a principled theory of religious
freedom.4 Professor Smith contends that a review of originalist evi-
dence will not reveal a principled theory, because the framers did not
agree on any particular approach to church-state issues.5 Instead, the
framers viewed the religion clauses only as means of assigning all reli-
gious liberty issues to the states.
Further, Professor Smith argues that any attempt to find the
proper" or "best" principle of religious freedom without reference to
history is doomed to failure. Professor Smith writes that there is "no
unitary principle of religious freedom; rather there are numerous ver-
sions of religious freedom ..... 16 Where a judge or scholar elevates
1 Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered, in 1
THE COMPLETE WRrINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963).
2 See STEVEN D.' SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEiST FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
3 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 15-16.
5 See id. at 16-17.
6 Id. at 12.
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one of these versions of religious freedom to the level of constitu-
tional theory, this decision is predetermined by a particular set of
background beliefs, and does not implement some "neutral" princi-
ple. Our legal system will adopt a coherent approach to religious free-
dom only if we treat each church-state issue as a "prudential matter, '7
properly resolved by elected officials working within a "pluralistic
political process."8
In his introduction, Professor Smith notes that one reviewer de-
scribed Foreordained Failure as "revolutionary"-and rightly so.9 Profes-
sor Smith's book is bold and original. Professor Smith does not
shrink from the implications of his account, and approaches his sub-
ject with an engaging writing style.
Part I of this Book Review describes Foreordained Failure as the cul-
mination of a growing pessimism in scholarship on religious liberty.
This section discusses the increasing skepticism about whether courts
may make any positive contribution to the protection of religious
liberty.
Part II describes and analyzes Professor Smith's assertions in Fore-
ordained Failure. First, Professor Smith argues that the framers did not
agree on any substantive principle of religious liberty when they
adopted the First Amendment. Instead, the religion clauses were
"purely jurisdictional in nature."10 Congress adopted the clauses
"merely to assign jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states.""
If the framers did not agree on any original understanding that
would give content to the religion clauses, Professor Smith argues that
an almost infinite number of theories of religious liberty are possible.
However, the choice of a particular theory will follow from the theo-
rist's background beliefs, and not from universal or neutral principles.
Because any particular theory of religious liberty will be no more or
less plausible than competing versions, Professor Smith concludes that
the implementation of any one theory will be illegitimate. Religious
freedom thus may be best achieved by elected officials "through com-
promise, cultivated tolerance, mutual forebearances, and strategic
silences."'12
Professor Smith explicitly disclaims any intent to propose norma-
tive conclusions.' 3 However, his approach strongly suggests "that
7 See id at 16.
8 Id. at 126.
9 M atv.
10 Id. at 17.
11 Id. at 26.
12 Id. at 117.
13 See id at vi-vii, 121-22.
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courts should simply get out of the business of protecting religious
freedom altogether.' 4 Such an approach would impose a harsh im-
pact on members of small, unorthodox religious groups. Such groups
lack access to legislators, who may be unfamiliar with a group's beliefs
and practices.
My primary disagreement with Professor Smith is on originalist
grounds. While Professor Smith argues that the framers did not agree
on any principle of religious liberty, I believe that the framers found
some common ground with respect to church-state issues. And while
as an abstract matter a government might derive a "principle of reli-
gious freedom" from a variety of norms, many such approaches would
clash with our constitutional language and history. Instead, the prin-
ciple of religious choice is particularly consistent with the language
and the history of the First Amendment.
Part III of this Book Review suggests that the framers reached a
consensus on the principle of religious choice, and implemented this
substantive principle when they adopted the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. Historical evidence indicates that by 1791, a con-
sensus had formed in support of the religious choice principle. Part
III also sketches a few implications of a law-and-religion jurisprudence
based on the principle of religious choice.
I. THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY THEORIES: THE ROAD TO
FoREoRDAINED FAILURE
A. The Golden Age of Religious Liberty Theories
Back in the 1960s, the 1970s, and even into the early 1980s, writ-
ing about church and state issues must have been a lot of fun. Judicial
opinions and commentaries seem buoyed with a spirit of optimism, a
sense that a search for principles would solve all of the complex
problems of religious liberty.
In 1961, Professor Philip Kurland published an article that re-
mains the most influential interpretative approach to the religion
clauses. Professor Kurland's strict neutrality principle provided:
"[R] eligion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights
or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations."' 5 After offer-
ing a mere five-page justification for this principle, 16 Professor Kur-
14 Id. at 121.
15 Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
25 (1961).
16 See id. at 2-6.
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land devoted ninety-one pages to an explanation of how his strict
neutrality principle would resolve every religious liberty case heard by
the United States Supreme Court.
17
During this time period, the Supreme Court Justices were not
bashful about invoking the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
The Court held that Wisconsin must exempt Amish students from
compulsory high school attendance,' 8 invalidated laws that governed
the teaching of man's origins in the public schools,1 9 and developed a
complex body of doctrine that regulated state aid to private, fre-
quently sectarian schools.20 '
After three decades, enthusiasm for judicial enforcement of the
religion clauses has waned. Even the most ardent defenders of judi-
cial review have a difficult time justifying some of the fine fact distinc-
tions offered by the Supreme Court as constitutional principles. A
state violates the Establishment Clause if it funds field trips at largely
sectarian private schools,21 but state funding of textbook "loans" to
private school students is permissible.22 A Christmas creche placed on
a staircase of the county courthouse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania vio-
lated the Establishment Clause,23 but the city probably could place a
Chanukah menorah outside of a nearby county office building.2 4
17 Id at 6-96.
18 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-36 (1972).
19 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-09 (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas
law prohibiting anyone employed at a state-supported school or university from teach-
ing "the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order
of animals").
20 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-55 (1977) (upholding parts of an
Ohio statute that provided books, standardized testing, diagnostic services, therapeu-
tic services, and remedial services to nonpublic school students, while invalidating
portions of the statute that funded instructional equipment and field trips for private
school students); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-72 (1975) (holding that Penn-
sylvania could loan texts to nonpublic school students, but the state could not fund
instructional materials, remedial instruction, or accelerated instruction provided at
nonpublic schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 774-98 (1973) (invalidating New York acts that provided grants for the
maintenance and repair of nonpublic school facilities, reimbursed low-income par-
ents for up to $100 of each student's nonpublic school tuition, and provided tax relief
to other low-income parents whose children attended nonpublic schools).
21 See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
22 See id. at 236-38.
23 See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-612 (1989).
24 See id& at 613-21. Although the Justices concluded that the menorah "does not
have an effect of endorsing religious faith," the Court acknowledged that a lower
court might determine that the menorah violated the Establishment Clause for an-
other reason. Id at 620-21.
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Scholarly attempts to develop a coherent principle of religious
liberty also have seemed to produce some unpalatable results. Con-
sider Jerry Swartzentruber, a Michigan resident and an Amish be-
liever. In order to prevent road accidents, Michigan law requires that
any slow-moving vehicle traveling at night must display a bright or-
ange reflector. For Swartzentruber, display of such a symbol on his
horse-drawn buggy would prove deeply offensive. The symbol would
violate Swartzentruber's sincere Amish beliefs, which mandate that
Swartzentruber must own only goods with a plain appearance.
25
Swartzentruber would not violate his religious convictions if he illumi-
nated the back of his wagon with a lantern.
Now assume that the Michigan legislature recognizes Swartzen-
truber's sincere religious belief, and enacts a statutory exemption.
Under this law, individuals need not display the bright orange reflec-
tor where this symbol would violate a sincere religious belief, and
where the individual could propose some alternative display that satis-
fied the state interest in roadway safety.
26
Under Professor Kurland's strict neutrality theory, the statutory
exemption would be unconstitutional. The state has excused only in-
dividuals invoking a sincere religious belief from the orange reflector
requirement. The exemption thus involves a classification on the ba-
sis of religion, forbidden by Professor Kurland's approach.
What is attractive about Professor Kurland's result? If a court in-
validates the reflector exemption, the ruling would seem inconsistent
with the original understanding of the religion clauses. Early Ameri-
can governments adopted statutory religious exemptions,27 including
25 See JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOcIETY 237 (4th ed. 1993) (describing the
Amish belief in plain dress as "an expression of obedience to God and of 'protest' to
the proud and disobedient world"); Lee J. Zook, Slow-Moving Vehicles, in THE AMISH
AND THE STATE 149 (Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (noting that although many Amish
believers display slow-moving vehicle symbols, some church members raise religious
objections to such symbols because "they are too 'loud' or bright in color").
26 See People v. Swartzentruber, 429 N.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988),
affd, 432 Mich. 873 (1989). In Swartzentruber, the Michigan legislature did not ex-
empt an Amish believer from the orange reflector requirement. Instead, a court deci-
sion relied on the Free Exercise Clause to mandate an exemption. See id at 228-29.
Under current Free Exercise Clause doctrine, a court could not order such an
exemption. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (stating that the
Free Exercise Clause does not authorize court-mandated religious exemptions).
27 As Michael McConnell has documented, early state governments exempted
religious believers from military conscription, testimonial oaths, and religious assess-
ments. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise




the federal law that exempted conscientious objectors from military
conscription.
28
Nor does invalidating the law seem like a prudent policy deci-
sion.29 While some commentators have concluded that any statutory
religious exemption violates the Establishment Clause, 0 such argu-
ments are a bit hard to see. Certainly, the reflector exemption does
not involve government "establishment" of a particular religion.
Michigan residents are not going to run out and join the Amish
Church so that they can drive their slow-moving vehicles without re-
flectors.31 In fact, the exemption does not favor religion at all. In-
stead, the exemption equalizes government treatment of the Amish
driver who staunchly opposes the reflector requirement, and the non-
Amish driver who views the reflector requirement as trivial.32
B. The Growing Skepticism
With judicial doctrine and academic theories producing unsatis-
factory results, increasing doubts have surfaced about the ability of
courts to facilitate religious liberty.33 Consider the writings of Profes-
28 Resolution of July 18, 1775, in 2 JouRNALs OF THE CONTNENTAL CONGRESS
1774-1789, at 187, 189 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter JOURNALS].
29 See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discre-
tionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 599 (1991) (stating that Pro-
fessor Kurland's approach "seems rigid, creating zero-sum games when other
possibilities seem present"). Professor Lupu would authorize court-mandated exemp-
tions, but not statutory religious exemptions. See id. at 600-09.
Professor Lupu's approach is precisely the opposite of the Supreme Court's cur-
rent Free Exercise Clause interpretation. The Court has authorized statutory reli-'
gious exemptions, but not court-mandated exemptions. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890
(finding that while elected legislators may adopt a "religious-practice exemption," a
court may not mandate a religious exemption).
30 See e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373, 386 (arguing that an approach authorizing statutory
religious exemptions "seems to deprive the Establishment Clause of meaning in-
dependent of the Free Exercise Clause").
31 See Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732,
740 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a New York law that carved out a
separate school district for a village populated entirely by an OrthodoxJewish sect did
not violate the Establishment Clause, because the law would not establish the sect's
religion and did not involve "religious favoritism").
32 Professor Steven Smith makes a similar point in a work that predates FOREOR-
DAINED FAILURE. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305,
354 (1990) (stating that court-mandated religious exemptions "are the product of
tolerance, not approval").
33 See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693,
693 (1997) ("[A] number of writers have concluded that at least at present, there is
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sor William Marshall, one of the most prolific and thoughtful recent
scholars on religious liberty. Professor Marshall and Professor Kur-
land endorse a similar, narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause.34
However, these scholars arrive at a minimalist interpretation by very
different routes. Professor Kurland's reading of the Free Exercise
Clause follows inexorably from his strict neutrality principle, which
prohibits any distinction between religious and nonreligious conduct.
In support of his narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause, Profes-
sor Marshall argues that some types of free exercise cases will be too
difficult for courts to adjudicate.
35
Professor Kurland and Professor Marshall both endorse a rela-
tively activist Establishment Clause doctrine. But again, these scholars
arrive at their conclusions by different routes. For Professor Kurland,
if a law benefits religion through the use of a religious classification,
the law violates the Establishment Clause.
Professor Marshall is far more tentative about judicial enforce-
ment of the Establishment Clause. For Professor Marshall, the Estab-
lishment Clause reflects "a concern that government action not
symbolize an endorsement of, or an improper relationship with, reli-
gion. '36 Professor Marshall writes that government action symbolizing
an improper state endorsement of religion "occurs without consis-
tency and is ultimately subjective since symbolic interpretation de-
pends upon the inclinations of those who perceive the symbol. '3 7
Professor Marshall acknowledges that his symbolic interpretation
leads to "the unsettling conclusion" that "establishment is inherently
inconsistent. ''38
no single viable principle or approach available for courts to use to decide cases
under the Religion Clauses.").
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that Congress shall make no law prohibit-
ing the free exercise of religion).
35 See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exer-
cise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 357, 386-88 (1989-90) (arguing that the Free
Exercise Clause should not authorize court-mandated exemptions from nondiscrimi-
natory laws, in part because such exemption cases require difficult inquiries into the
sincerity and religiosity of beliefs); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 310-11 (1991).
36 William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It". The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 So. CAL. L. REV. 495, 513 (1986).
37 Id. at 550.
38 Id. Professor Marshall suggests some guidelines for making Establishment
Clause law more predictable. Professor Marshall recommends that courts separate
Establishment Clause cases into three distinct categories: cases involving the public
schools, cases involving government practices and regulatory programs, and cases in-
volving aid to parochial education. See id. at 540-50. Further, Professor Marshall
argues that courts may reduce the subjectivity of Establishment Clause decisions by
[VOL- 74:3
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Doubts about the wisdom of judicial efforts to protect religious
liberty also have crept into judicial opinions. In 1990, the Supreme
Court dramatically reduced the significance of the Free Exercise
Clause.39 Today, a plaintiff may allege a Free Exercise Clause viola-
tion only in the thankfully rare cases of intentional religious discrimi-
nation.40 The Free Exercise Clause no longer applies in a much more
familiar situation, where a law resulting from permissible motivations
imposes a disproportionate burden on a particular religion.
41
Recall Jerry Swartzentruber's opposition to the Michigan reflec-
tor law. Prior to 1990, Swartzentruber could have sought a court-man-
dated exemption from the law.42 But assuming that the reflector
requirement did not result from an intent to discriminate against the
Amish, today Swartzentruber would not have a Free Exercise Clause
claim.
The Supreme Court has not yet authored a wholesale revision of
Establishment Clause law. Nonetheless, some recent cases suggest a
judicial retreat in this area as well.43
invoking the principle of stare decisis and deferring to previous decisions. See id. at
550.
39 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (concluding that a
'neutral law of general applicability" does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
40 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-47 (1993) (invalidating a series of Hialeah, Florida ordinances, which intention-
ally discriminated against members of the Santeria religion who conducted ritual
animal sacrifices).
41 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160-61 (1997) (reaffirming the
holding in Employment Division v. Smith, which concliuded that plaintiffs could not
bring Free Exercise Clause challenges to "neutral laws of general applicability").
42 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-36 (1972) (mandating that Wis-
consin must exempt Amish students from the state's compulsory high school attend-
ance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-10 (1963) (holding that South
Carolina must exempt a Seventh-Day Adventist from an unemployment compensation
law, which required that the claimant must be willing to work on her Saturday Sab-
bath, or must forego benefits).
In a 1988 decision, a Michigan appellate court ordered that the state must ex-
empt Jerry Swartzentruber from the reflector law. See People v. Swartzentruber, 429
N.W.2d 225, 227-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 873 (1989).
43 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2008-17 (1997) (holding that a
federal program providing remedial instruction to disadvantaged children at private,
primarily sectarian schools does not violate the Establishment Clause, and reversing
prior decisions to the contrary); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 758-71 (1993) (concluding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit
the erection of a cross by the Klu Klux Klan at the Ohio capital grounds). But cf Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-99 (1992) (holding that a prayer ceremony at a Provi-
dence, Rhode Island middle school violated the Establishment Clause).
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II. PROFESSOR SMITH AND THE FurrLiTY OF THEORY
Enter Steven Smith. Professor Smith takes the current uneasiness
about religious liberty theories to a new level. For Professor Smith,
developing a coherent judicial doctrine of religious liberty is not
merely illusive or problematic. It's impossible.
Professor Smith writes that the framers did not agree on any sub-
stantive principle of religious liberty. Instead, the framers enacted the
religion clauses solely to relegate all questions about religious liberty
to the states. Given the absence of any original agreement about
church-state relationships, current disagreements on a variety of
church-state issues foreclose the development of a coherent, princi-
pled approach to religious liberty issues. As a result, courts should not
attempt to protect religious liberty by relying on the Free Exercise
Clause or the Establishment Clause.
A. Professor Smith's Originalist Account
1. Introduction
Professor Smith argues that when the framers of the Constitution
adopted the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the framers did
not agree on any substantive principle of religious liberty.44 Instead,
the framers adopted the First Amendment "merely to assign jurisdic-
tion over matters of religion to the states. '45 Professor Smith bases
this conclusion primarily on three historical arguments.
First, Professor Smith contends that the framers "held contradic-
tory positions at a basic level" about the proper relationship between
government and religion.46 As a result of this basic disagreement, the
framers could not agree on any substantive principle of religious
liberty.
Second, Professor Smith highlights statements made by support-
ers and opponents of the Constitution. Professor Smith contends that
these statements affirmed that the religion clauses were adopted solely
to insure that only the states could legislate on matters affecting
religion.
Third, Professor Smith argues that the lack of any meaningful
debate about the religion clauses either in Congress or in the state
ratifying conventions supports the argument that the framers did not
44 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 21 ("If we ask, therefore, what principle or theory of
religious liberty the framers and ratifiers of the religion clauses adopted, the most
accurate answer is 'None.'").




adopt any substantive principle in the religion clauses. Given the level
of disagreement about the proper relationship between church and
state at the time of the First Amendment, the choice of any particular
substantive principle would have evoked considerable controversy.
Accordingly, the lack of debate strongly suggests that the religion
clauses did not embody any particular conception of church-state rela-
tionships. Instead, the clauses merely assigned jurisdiction over reli-
gious liberty issues to the states.
Professor Smith's argument seems at odds with the language of
the First Amendment, which does not explicitly delegate jurisdiction
over religious liberty issues to the states. In his response to this Book
Review, Professor Smith acknowledges that "the framers of the First
Amendment did not actually use the words 'no jurisdiction."'
47
This omission is significant because other amendments in the Bill
of Rights are so clearlyjurisdictional. For example, the Tenth Amend-
ment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. '48 If the framers had wished to assign all jurisdiction over church-
state issues to the states, the language of the religion clauses might
look something like: "All questions respecting religion are reserved to
the states." The language of the First Amendment looks nothing like
this.
I am not persuaded by Professor Smith's jurisdictional argument
primarily for two additional reasons. Although Professor Smith accu-
rately reports that conceptions of religious liberty varied from state to
state in the late eighteenth century, by the time of the Constitution all
of the states had reached a consensus on at least one critical point.
Specifically, all of the states agreed to accept private religious choices.
This tolerance of religious choice departed dramatically from prac-
tices prior to the Revolutionary War, when the colonies had punished
religious dissenters with imprisonment, banishment, and death. In
Part III of this Book Review, I argue that the religion clauses were
designed to protect this substantive principle of religious choice.49
In addition, Professor Smith's argument that the religion clauses
assigned exclusive 'Jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states" '5
0
was contrary to actual federal practices when Congress adopted the
First Amendment. Congress was not shy about passing laws that af-
47 Steven D. Smith, The Religion Clauses in Constitutional Scholarship, 74 Nom
DAME L. REV. 1033, 1045-46 (1999).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 145-214.
50 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 18.
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fected church-state relationships, both before and after the adoption
of the First Amendment. Further, it would have been virtually impos-
sible for Congress to avoid enacting legislation that affected religious
liberty.
Professor Smith also relies on statements about church-state rela-
tionships made during the founding period, and on the lack of debate
about the religion clauses. I have a similar reaction to both of these
arguments. The statements cited by Professor Smith are typically terse
and ambiguous. These statements may have advocated Professor
Smith's jurisdictional approach, or the substantive principle of volun-
tary religious choice, or some entirely different approach.
The lack of debate about the religion clauses is similarly unen-
lightening. At most, the lack of debate probably suggests that the
framers did not intend some radical change from existing practices
when they adopted the religion clauses. But Professor Smith's juris-
dictional interpretation would have involved a fairly dramatic change
in the federal approach to religion issues. Therefore, I believe that
the lack of debate on the religion clauses actually undercuts rather
than supports Professor Smith's jurisdictional argument.
2. Disagreements in Principle About the Relationship Between
Government and Religion
Professor Smith accurately observes that with respect to proper
church-state relationships, "views in the new nation were of course di-
verse.151 Professor Smith then identifies two basic positions that di-
vided Americans-the traditional position and the voluntarist
position.
52
According to Professor Smith, the traditionalists and voluntarists
diverged primarily on whether and to what extent government should
support religion. In early America, state-mandated religious assess-
ments collected on behalf of the prevailing church provided the most
tangible form of such support. Professor Smith writes: "The tradi-
tional position regarded governmental support for religion as essen-
51 Id. at 19.
52 Professor Smith also suggests that a significant group of Americans may have
embraced a third position, which was hostile to organized churches. Professor Smith
describes this position as the "heretical position." SMITH, supra note 2, at 20-21.
However, Professor Smith is uncertain about whether a significant number of
Americans ever favored such a position. Even if the heretical position had gained
some followers, this view probably had little influence in post-revolutionary America
because "its proponents seem to have found it prudent to be discreet about their
actual opinions." Id. at 20.
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tial to the social order, while the voluntarist position opposed such
support."
53
Given the controversy that surrounded the question of whether
the state directly should support a particular religion, Professor Smith
writes that "it is hard to see how the founding generation could have
agreed on any substantive answer to the religion question. '54 So they
did not agree. Instead, the religion clauses "were purely jurisdictional
in nature."5 5 Congress adopted the religion clauses "merely to assign
jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states."
56
Although Professor Smith does provide some other examples of
the divergent approaches to religion in different states,5 7 Professor
Smith's originalist argument rests heavily on the disagreement about
government support for religion, or religious assessments.58 But even
assuming that the propriety of such assessments was the only signifi-
cant religious liberty issue debated at the time of the passage of the
Bill of Rights, the founders did not disagree about religious assess-
ments to the extent suggested by Professor Smith.
In fact, by 1789 a clear trend toward the abolition of religious
assessments had developed in the United States. As of 1758, nine of
the original thirteen states collected taxes that supported ministries,59
with only four states declining to collect assessments.
60
53 Id- at 21.
54 Id. at 26.
55 Id at 17.
56 Id. at 26.
57 See id. at 37-39.
58 See id at 19-22, 26-27.
59 The nine states that collected assessments were Connecticut, Georgia, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia. See THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FrisT FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRSr AMENDmENT 82-83 (1986) (describing the Connecticut
law that authorized religious assessments in 1708); id. at 152-53 (noting a 1758 Geor-
gia law providing that liquor tax revenues would support churches); id. at 49 (stating
that in 1702, "Maryland law authorized taxes to support Anglican worship"); id. at 82
(the Massachusetts charter of 1691 mandated that citizens must pay assessments to
support congregational ministers); id. (describing the New Hampshire practice where
each town collected local taxes to support a minister); id. at 62-63 (in 1683, a New
York law mandated religious assessments); id. at 60 (in 1715, a North Carolina law
mandated that the inhabitants of each parish must support an Anglican minister); id.
at 58-59 (in 1706, the South Carolina assembly provided that ministers would draw
their salaries from public monies); id. at 29 (by 1624, the practice of collecting assess-
ments was established in Virginia).
60 The four states that never collected religious assessments were Delaware, see id.
at 106, NewJersey, see id. at 72, 106, Pennsylvania, see id., and Rhode Island, see id at
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Between 1758 and 1789, five states that had collected religious
assessments repudiated the practice. 61 In 1789, nine states proscribed
religious assessments. Such taxes were collected in only four states,
located primarily in New England.
6 2
Professor Smith thus overstates the level of disagreement about
government support for religion that existed when the First Amend-
ment was drafted and ratified. Professor Smith correctly observes that
some citizens continued to support religious assessments "I[y] ears after
the adoption of the religion clauses. '63 Massachusetts did not abolish
religious assessments until 1833.64 But Professor Smith exaggerates
when he writes that in 1789, the founders "held contradictory posi-
tions at a basic level" as to whether government directly should sup-
port a state-sanctioned religion.6 5 Without question, by 1789 the
United States was moving toward the abolition of such preferential
government support.
But even if citizens in the new nation were hopelessly deadlocked
on whether government should support a particular religion, that
does not mean that Americans failed to reach any consensus on
church-state issues. Citizens today clash about whether government
should fund sectarian and other private schools. 66 Nonetheless, the
61 Maryland abolished religious assessments in 1776. See id. at 153-54. By 1784,
New York had discontinued assessments. See id. at 161-62. In its Constitution of
1776, North Carolina made all religious contributions voluntary. See id. at 151-52. In
1778, the South Carolina Constitution endorsed the same result. See id. at 151. After
the publication ofJames Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, Madison's home state of Virginia abolished religious assessments in 1786.
See id. at 134.
62 In 1798, Georgia's third Constitution made all religious assessments voluntary.
See id. at 153. Connecticut continued to support churches through religious assess-
ments until 1818. See PAUL WAKEMAN COONs, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
IN CONNECrICUT 29-30 (1936). New Hampshire did not abolish religious assessments
until 1819. See CuRRY, supra note 59, at 188. In 1833, Massachusetts was the final state
to eliminate religious assessments. See id. at 164.
63 SMITH, supra note 2, at 20.
64 See CuRRY, supra note 59, at 164.
65 SMITH, supra note 2, at 26.
66 Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing that any government aid to sectarian schools violates the
Establishment Clause) and G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools:
A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 827 (1978) ("Governmental aid
specifically earmarked to defray any part of the total cost of education in sectarian
schools constitutes a prohibited establishment of religion.") withJesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260, 265-66 (1968)
(arguing that government aid to parochial schools does not violate the Establishment
Clause, "so long as such aid does not exceed the value of the secular educational
service rendered by the school") and Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional
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presence of this controversy does not prove that our society lacks any
consensus with respect to all religious liberty issues. To take an obvi-
ous example, almost everyone agrees that state governments should
notjail non-Christians as heretics. Although the framers regarded the
propriety of religious assessments as an important and controversial
issue, this controversy does not prove that the framers failed to reach
any agreement about religious liberty.
In fact, general agreement did emerge with respect to some is-
sues. During the Revolutionary period, a number of state statutes pro-
vided exemptions from testimonial oaths for religious believers who
opposed such oaths.67 I am not aware of any significant opposition to
these statutes.
At about the same time, twelve of the thirteen original states
adopted constitutional provisions that protected the "freedom of con-
science" and "the free exercise of religion."68 Professor Smith quickly
concludes that these provisions lacked any substantive import.69 As
discussed in more detail below,70 the explicit language of the state
constitutional provisions sheds considerable light on the meaning of
the tersely written federal First Amendment.
Most significantly, Americans living in the new republic reached a
consensus regarding the treatment of religious dissenters. Simply put,
Americans agreed that it was improper to outlaw a religion, or to pun-
ish believers with imprisonment or banishment on account of their
private religious choices. As described in Part III of this Book Review,
this consensus represented a dramatic departure from prevailing prac-
tices in colonial America.71 The toleration of religious dissidents, the
Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 87, 93 (1996) ("[T] he Constitution permits
government to defray the costs of private norm-creating activity, including religious
activity, so long as government does not discriminate among religious views or be-
tween religious and secular views.") and Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 311, 358 (1986) ("IT]he Constitution permits the state to take steps to
remedy the financial inequality confronting those choosing between state-run and
religious education.").
67 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 27, at 1468 ("By 1789, virtually all of the states
had enacted oath exemptions."); David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free
Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REv. 241, 266-67 (1995) (citing
early statutes that exempted objecting religious believers from testimonial oaths).
68 See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1455-66 (noting that by 1789, every state
except Connecticut had adopted a constitutional provision that protected religious
freedom).
69 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 40.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
71 See infra text accompanying notes 145-214.
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testimonial oath exemptions, and the freedom of conscience provi-
sions all followed from a substantive principle that most Americans
had come to accept-the principle of religious choice.
3. Statements About the Effect of the Religion Clauses
Professor Smith also identifies some statements by supporters and
opponents of the Constitution, which according to Professor Smith
indicate that the framers adopted the religion clauses solely to assign
jurisdiction over religious liberty issues to the states. Professor Smith
acknowledges that the framers never provided a systematic explana-
tion about the meaning of the religion clauses in Congress, at the
state ratifying conventions, or anywhere else. 72 Professor Smith thus
must attempt to divine an interpretation from a few isolated remarks
and fragments of conversations.
7 3
At first glance, some of these fragments seem to support Profes-
sor Smith's argument that the religion clauses were purely jurisdic-
tional. For example, Professor Smith quotes a statement made by
James Madison during the Virginia Constitutional Convention:
"There is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter-
meddle with religion."74 Professor Smith reads this statement as pro-
viding that the federal government could not "intermeddle with" the
decisions of each state government on religious liberty issues.
75
But is that really what Madison meant? Madison might have
meant that the federal government could not "intermeddle with" the
religious choices of private citizens. In other words, while colonial
governments had punished individuals because they had chosen a dis-
favored religion, the First Amendment prevented the federal govern-
ment from engaging in similar persecutions. In contrast to Professor
Smith's jurisdictional interpretation, this alternative approach would
read the First Amendment as enacting the substantive principle of
religious choice.
76
72 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 26.
73 Although the framers provided no systematic interpretation of the religion
clauses, a number of authors had developed theories of religious liberty. These writ-
ers ranged from the Enlightenment philosopher John Locke, to the evangelical
preacher John Leland. In Part III of this Book Review, I argue that the principle of
religious choice united the Enlightenment and evangelical proponents of religious
liberty. See infra text accompanying notes 145-214.
74 SMITH, supra note 2, at 28 (citing McConnell, supra note 27, at 1477).
75 See SMrI, supra note 2, at 28.
76 In his reply to this Book Review, Professor Smith emphasizes that Madison
made this statement "in the Virginia convention-not, as Professor Steinberg seems to
assume, after the religion clauses had been drafted or adopted .... " Smith, supra
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In the footnotes to Foreordained Failure, Professor Smith quotes a
similar statement from Richard Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina: "As
to the subject of religion... [n]o power is given to the general gov-
ernment to interfere with it all. Any act of Congress on this subject
would be an usurpation."77 According to Professor Smith, Spaight
meant that the federal government could not "interfere with" state
decisions on religious liberty issues. But Spaight might have meant
that Congress could legislate on church-state issues, as long as Con-
gress did not "interfere with" private religious choices.
78
In short, these statements may indicate that the First Amendment
was intended as a jurisdictional provision that prevented Congress
from "intermeddling" with each state's regulation of religion, or as a
substantive provision that prevented Congress from interfering with
private religious choices. The statements cited by Professor Smith are
ambiguous, and subject to more than one plausible interpretation. At
best, such statements provide limited support for Professor Smith's
thesis that the framers did not enact some substantive principle when
they adopted the religion clauses.
4. The Lack of Debate
Professor Smith cites the lack of debate about the religion clauses
in support of his jurisdictional interpretation of the clauses. Professor
Smith accurately notes that congressional discussions of the religion
clauses were "desultory and superficial," while most state ratifying con-
ventions "approved the measure with even less reflection or discus-
sion."79 In fact, the complete discussion of the religion clauses in the
House of Representatives consumes less than three pages.80 Any Sen-
note 47, at 7. But I find Madison's comment to be ambiguous because of the content,
rather than the timing. Madison's terse statement that the federal government could
not "intermeddle with religion" is susceptible to interpretations other than the juris-
dictional interpretation advocated by Professor Smith.
77 I- at 137 n.28 (quoting LEONARD W. LEW, THE Es TuAshsmEwr CLAUSE: REL-
GION AND THE FIRsr AmENrD r 66 (1986)).
78 Professor Smith also paraphrases Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who stated
in the House of Representatives that "no constitutional provision on the subject of
religion was needed because Congress had no power to establish religion anyway."
SMrrH, supra note 2, at 28-29. Sherman's statement provides only that Congress had
no power "to establish religion," not that Congress lacked the power to legislate on
any church-state issue. Also, because Sherman opposed the First Amendment, I am
uncertain whether his statements about the amendment are particularly authoritative.
79 SrmrrH, supra note 2, at 26.
80 See CURRY, supra note 59, at 200-02 (quoting the full text of the discussion in
the House of Representatives).
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ate debate on the religion clauses was not recorded.81 Professor
Smith contends that such complacency would make sense "if the enac-
tors believed that they were not answering the difficult [church-state]
questions at all but were merely deferring those questions to someone
else-the states.
'82
It's so hard to know what implications one should draw from si-
lence. Perhaps the only safe assumption is that when Congress en-
acted the religion clauses, the legislators did not intend any radical
changes in the status quo. If Congress had intended that the clauses
would result in significant law reform, one would have expected vigor-
ous debates about the advisability of the proposed changes.
As discussed above, I believe that the religion clauses were in-
tended in part to prohibit Congress from punishing an individual be-
cause of her religious beliefs. If this was the case, then the lack of
debate relating to the clauses would not be surprising. As discussed in
more detail in Part III of this Book Review, by 1789 all of the states
had abandoned the previous practice of imprisoning and banishing
religious dissenters. 8
3
Professor Smith asserts that a decision by Congress to leave all
religious liberty issues to the states would have provoked little de-
bate.84 But if the religion clauses indeed deprived Congress of all au-
thority to legislate on church-state issues, this jurisdictional approach
might have been a good deal more controversial than Professor Smith
suggests. During the Revolutionary War, Congress had exempted
members of pacifist religious groups from compulsory military ser-
vice. 85 If the religion clauses indeed assigned 'Jurisdiction over mat-
ters of religion to the states," 86 then Congress presumably could no
longer legislate on church-state issues by adopting a draft exemption
for pacifist believers. 87 One might expect that some federal represent-
81 See id. at 206 ("Senate reports on the debates on the Bill of Rights are even
more sketchy than those of the House.").
82 SMITH, supra note 2, at 27.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 174-91.
84 Professor Smith is correct that state legislators enacted most of the laws affect-
ing religion before and after the Constitutional Convention. See SMITH, supra note 2,
at 38-39.
85 See Resolution of July 18, 1775 in 2 JouRNAts, supra note 28, at 187, 189.
86 SMITH, supra note 2, at 26.
87 Under Professor Smith's interpretation of the religion clauses, it is unclear
whether any law requiring compulsory military service would be constitutional. If
Congress required pacifist believers to disobey religious tenets and serve in the mili-
tary, the federal representatives presumably would have passed a law resolving a reli-
gious liberty issue. But according to Professor Smith's reading of the religion clauses,
only the state governments could legislate on such issues.
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atives would oppose this reduction in congressional authority, or at
least would believe that the change deserved discussion. If the fram-
ers had intended that the religion clauses would divest Congress of all
jurisdiction over religious liberty issues, such a result might have
seemed too controversial to greet with silence.
5. The Implausibility of a Purely Jurisdictional Interpretation
In arguing that the religion clauses "were purely jurisdictional in
nature,"88 Professor Smith analogizes the clauses to a hypothetical fed-
eral law on school curriculum matters. In this hypothetical law, Con-
gress concludes that school curriculum issues "should all be resolved
on the state and local levels."8 9 Such a law would have "no substantive
meaning independent of its federalism."'90 Professor Smith concludes
that the religion clauses similarly were intended to provide state gov-
ernments with exclusive jurisdiction over church-state issues.91
Professor Smith's analogy overlooks a key difference between his
hypothetical school curriculum law and the religion clauses. A law
delegating school curriculum issues entirely to local governments is
plausible, because Congress rarely has addressed such issues.92
Congress not only has legislated on churcl-state issues, but con-
gressional involvement on such issues seems inescapable. As already
noted, the first Continental Congress faced a church-state issue when
the lawmakers enacted compulsory military service. If Congress re-
quired pacifist believers to serve in the armed forces, the law could
violate the free exercise of religion by infringing on the believers' con-
science. If Congress exempted only pacifist believers from military
service, the law would mandate different treatment for members of
particular religions. One might view such a statutory exemption as an
impermissible establishment of religion. The Continental Congress
88 S rrH, supra note 2, at 170.
89 Id at 24.
90 Id
91 Seeid at 26.
92 In the United States, local government institutions traditionally have devel-
oped the curriculum of the public schools. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 863 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("The Court has long recognized that local school
boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs."); Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools.. . ."); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education in our Nation is committed
to the control of state and local authorities.").
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resolved this dilemma by exempting members of pacifist religious
groups from compulsory military service.93
At the time when Congress drafted the Bill of Rights, the legisla-
tors were not shy about implementing federal measures that affected
religious liberty. As Professor Smith recognizes, Congress passed a
resolution authorizing a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, ap-
pointed chaplains to serve the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, and appointed chaplains for the army.9
4
If the religion clauses assigned jurisdiction over matters of reli-
gion to the states, as Professor Smith argues, then Congress could not
have adopted the prayer resolution or appointed chaplains. But when
Congress approved these actions, the legislators must have decided
that the measures were not laws "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion" or "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."95 Contrary to Profes-
sor Smith's assertion, the religion clauses must have included a
substantive component.9
6
In attempting to deal with these congressional actions that af-
fected religious liberty, Professor Smith contends that Congress had
agreed to "a partial renunciation ofjurisdiction over religion."97 Pro-
fessor Smith writes that such an approach "would effectively assign to
the states the major, controversial issues of religion-issues regarding
the 'establishment' and regulation of religion-and it would defer the
residual, nonassignable issues of religion to the future."98 I'm not en-
tirely certain what Professor Smith means by the phrase "partial re-
nunciation of jurisdiction." 99  Congress undoubtedly deferred
resolution of issues not before the legislators, just as the Supreme
Court cannot decide a religious liberty issue not yet brought to court.
However, Congress did take action on issues affecting religion.
Congress could approve these measures only after deciding upon a
substantive definition of the religion clauses that permitted such ac-
tion. The religion clauses thus did not simply assign jurisdiction over
93 See Resolution of July 18, 1775, in 2 JOURNALS, supra note 28, at 187, 189.
94 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 33-34; see also CuRRY, supra note 59, at 217-18.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
96 See CuRRY, supra note 59, at 217. With respect to the adoption of the prayer
resolution, Professor Curry writes: "In the House discussion of the matter, Tucker of
South Carolina argued that 'this ... is a business with which Congress have nothing to
do; it is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us.' Congress obviously did
not agree." Id.
97 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 33.
98 Id. at 33-34.
99 Id. at 33.
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religious liberty issues to the states. The phrases "free exercise" and
"establishment of religion" retained some substantive meaning.
6. Summary
Much of Professor Smith's historical account is entirely accurate
and appropriate. In the early colonial period, different regions of the
United States followed very different practices with respect to church-
state relationships. 100 When the Bill of Rights was adopted, some of
those differences persisted.
In addition, Professor Smith accurately observes that a central
purpose of the religion clauses was to allow each state to make its own
decisions about religious liberty, by preventing Congress from passing
laws "respecting an establishment of religion" or "prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."'1 1 According to modem doctrine, that all changed
with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, which incorporated the religion clauses and made these provi-
sions applicable to the states.10 2
However, I am not persuaded by Professor Smith's assertion that
when the framers approved the religion clauses, they "did not adopt
any substantive right or principle of religious freedom."'0 3 In my
opinion, the framers' few terse statements about the meaning of the
religion clauses, and the lack of debate on the clauses, provide no
more than modest support for Professor Smith's jurisdiction
argument.
In his most convincing historical argument, Professor Smith
maintains that because "Americans in the late eighteenth-century held
contradictory positions at a basic level regarding the religion ques-
tion," they could not have agreed "on any substantive answer to the
100 See generally CURY, supra note 59, at 1-77 (describing the divergent church-
state relationships in the early colonies).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, making the Establishment Clause applicable to the states);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (concluding that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Class incorporates the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, making the Free Exercise Clause applicable to the states). Profes-
sor Smith does not take a position on the debate about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, because "if the" religion clauses as origi-
nally understood were purely jurisdictional ... then they contained no substantive
right or principle of religious freedom that could have been 'incorporated' even if
the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment had wanted to incorporate them."
SMrrH, supra note 2, at 50.
103 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 17.
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religion question."10 4 Despite some disagreements on important
church-state issues, I believe that Americans at the time of the Bill of
Rights had reached a consensus on at least one basic principle. As
discussed in Part III, Americans had come to support the principle of
religious choice. The framers embodied this principle in the religion
clauses.
B. Professor Smith's Theoretical Account
After concluding that the framers of the religion clauses did not
agree on any substantive principle of religious liberty, Professor Smith
considers whether one might construct a theory of religious liberty
without reference to any original understanding. Professor Smith
concludes that an almost infinite number of such theories are possi-
ble. 10 5 The particular theory that a judge or scholar endorses will de-
pend upon her "background beliefs about religion, government,
society, and human psychology."' 0 6 Because a theory of religious lib-
erty will develop out of a nonuniversal collection of background be-
liefs and not from neutral principles, the theory will be illegitimate.
10 7
In the abstract, a variety of different church-state relationships
are plausible. But I do not agree with Professor Smith that the First
Amendment religion clauses are susceptible to a variety of equally
plausible interpretations. As a matter of linguistics, the terms "estab-
lishment of religion" and "free exercise of religion" simply do not pos-
sess an infinite number of meanings.
Professor Smith is at his best when he criticizes the frequently
stated exhortation that government must be "neutral" with respect to
religion.' 08 According to the Supreme Court, the principle of neutral-
ity requires that government "may not be hostile to any religion or to
the advocacy of no-religion, and it may not aid, foster, or promote one
religion or religious theory against another ....
Government cannot be neutral, but instead must choose between
different approaches to church-state relationships. As Professor Smith
observes: "Indeed, it would not be much of an overstatement to say
104 Id. at 26.
105 See, e.g., id. at 102 (in determining whether religion inculcates civic virtue,
"[t]he only plausible answer... is '[i]t depends'-on the kind of religion, the kind of
society, and the existence and effectiveness of other institutions for inculcating civic
virtue").
106 Id. at 67.
107 See id. at 60.
108 See id. at 77 ("Perhaps the most pervasive theme in modem judicial and aca-
demic discourse on the subject of religious freedom is 'neutrality.'").
109 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
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that modem legal discourse about religious freedom consists of
judges and legal scholars unblushingly proclaiming their 'neutrality'
even as they reject both the premises and the conclusions of their
adversaries.""l 0
At the heart of his attack on claims of neutrality, Professor Smith
presents a hypothetical based on Reynolds v. United States."' In the
1878 Reynolds decision, the Supreme Court refused to exempt George
Reynolds from a federal law that prohibited polygamy, even though
this practice was a sincerely held tenet of Reynolds' Mormon
religion.
112
Professor Smith posits a slightly more complex version of the fol-
lowing hypothetical." 3 Imagine that two groups inhabit a society-
the secularists and the theologians. According to the secularists, the
uniform application of the laws constitutes a primary goal of good
government. The secularists believe that uniform law application
helps to prevent arbitrary and malicious prosecutions, discourages
lawlessness, and serves many other laudable purposes. When a secular
law and a religious tenet clash, a secularist would not exempt a be-
liever from the law.
On the other hand, the theologians believe that protecting reli-
gious convictions should be the primary goal of good government.
Therefore, when religious dictates and a secular law clash, govern-
ment should allow the believer to follow her conscience whenever
possible.
Professor Smith's hypothetical illustrates that a court cannot de-
cide the polygamy case and remain neutral. If the Supreme Court
refuses to exempt George Reynolds from the polygamy law, the court
agrees with the secularists and the theologians lose. If the court man-
dates an exemption, the theologians win and the secularists lose. No
middle ground is possible.
Professor Smith later reinforces this point with a second hypo-
thetical, based on Epperson v. Arkansas.1 14 Arkansas has enacted a law
that prohibits anyone employed at a state-supported school or univer-
sity from teaching the evolutionary theory of man's origins." 5 Arkan-
sas adopted this law to insure that its schools would teach the
creationist account that appears in the Bible.
116
110 SMITH, supra note 2, at 78.
111 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
112 See id at 161-67.
113 See SMrrH, supra note 2, at 68-70.
114 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
115 See id. at 98-99.
116 See id at 103, 107-09.
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Assume that the theologians favor the Arkansas law. This group
accepts creationism as a religious tenet. Members are deeply of-
fended by assertions that man evolved from apes. On the other hand,
the secularists believe in an evolutionary account of man's origins.
Secularists view creationism as superstitious nonsense, offensive to any
educated mind.
The Epperson Court invalidated the Arkansas law, concluding that
the law was not neutral. 117 Of course the law wasn't neutral. Arkansas
had prohibited the teaching of evolution, and had allowed the teach-
ing of creationism. But in mandating that the state could not prohibit
the teaching of evolution, the Supreme Court decision also wasn't
neutral. The theologians won before the Arkansas legislature. The
secularists won before the United States Supreme Court.118
Government thus cannot rely on neutral principles as the basis
for church-state decisions. Professor Smith accurately asserts: "Theo-
ries of religious freedom will always rest on background beliefs that
provide reasons for tolerating or protecting some aspects of religious
practice and for regulating other aspects." 11 9 But here Professor
Smith reaches a curious conclusion. A theory of religious liberty that
rests on such background beliefs must be a "bad theory."
120
In fact, all law creation involves choosing from a variety of possi-
ble regimes.12 1 Legal choices inevitably follow from the background
beliefs of a particular society and its lawmakers.' 22 If government
could not make nonneutral choices, anarchy would result.
117 See id. at 103-04, 109.
118 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 84. Smith noted that the Epperson Court's conclu-
sion "rejected the fundamentalist position; and upon reflection it is also apparent that
in its premises the Court had rejected in advance the fundamentalist position and back-
ground beliefs, with their emphasis on biblical literalism as the avenue to truth." Id.
119 Id. at 67.
120 Id. at 60.
121 Cf John H. Garvey, Is There a Principle of Religious Liberty?, 94 MicH. L. REV.
1379, 1389 (1996) (reviewing SMrri, supra note 2) ("Any theory of freedom worth
fighting for will make assumptions about what human beings are like and how they
ought to behave.").
122 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U.
MIAI L. REV. 505, 529 (1987) (asserting that judicial choices are "constrained in
significant ways by a variety of phenomena that make up the professional 'culture'
within which legal decisionmaking takes place"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science
and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DuKE LJ. 624, 625 ("Lawyers did not invent racism.
Rather they created racist institutions because society was racist and racism was im-
plicit in its values."); see also William P. LaPiana, Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes's Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832 (1990) (describing the
belief of Oliver Wendell Holmes that "legal doctrine did not develop according to
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A Free Speech Clause example may illustrate that although neu-
trality is impossible, principled constitutional interpretation is not.
23
In free speech cases, different types of speech form a hierarchy. Polit-
ical speech receives the most protection from government regulation.
Commercial speech receives somewhat less protection. Still other
forms of expression, such as obscenity or "fighting words," receive lit-
tle or no protection.
124
It doesn't have to be this way. Under one possible approach, all
types of speech would receive the same amount of protection, regard-
less of content. Or obscenity could receive the most protection, with
political speech receiving little or no protection.
While a government could adopt each of these versions of free-
dom of speech, each version is not an equally sensible interpretation
of the First Amendment. Strong textual and historical evidence dem-
onstrates that the framers adopted the Free Speech Clause primarily
to protect political speech. 25 While no law of nature requires that
political speech must receive a high level of protection, such an ap-
proach provides a more appropriate interpretation of the Free Speech
Clause than other alternatives.
Similarly, although a variety of approaches to religious liberty are
possible, these approaches would not all provide an equally plausible
reading of the religion clauses. Consider a federal statute requiring
that all individuals must pledge their allegiance to a particular state-
logical rules, but rather reflected a society's social structure as well as its conscious
judgments about policy").
123 See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1391 (questioning "why a theory of religious
freedom (or any other kind of freedom) must be neutral").
124 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitu-
tional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most pro-
tected position; commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are
regarded as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the
least protection of all."); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (noting that
picketing about political and social issues "has always rested on the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values").
125 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. Rxs.J. 521,528 (asserting that the framers protected free expression "because
of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power"); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Or. REv. 245, 253-55 (argu-
ing that the language and the structure of the United States Constitution indicate that
the Free Speech Clause provides an absolute protection to political speech, which
government may not limit). But cf. CAss 1. SuN'tsmnN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH xiv (1993) (observing that a historical inquiry about the meaning of
the First Amendment "does not reveal a clear-cut understanding of what speech was
protected and what speech was not").
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endorsed faith. Citizens who refused to take the pledge would be im-
prisoned, or expelled from the United States.
A government plausibly might assert that requiring allegiance to
a particular state-endorsed church promotes religious liberty, in much
the same way that nations have claimed to hold "democratic elections"
while allowing only one political party to appear on the ballot. By
requiring that all individuals mustjoin the one true religion, the gov-
ernment would insure the salvation of all souls.
But now imagine attempting to explain why the statute that re-
quires allegiance to a state-endorsed church is not an "establishment
of religion." For a court to conclude that the hypothetical statute was
consistent with the First Amendment, a judge must engage in the
most awkward twisting of the Establishment Clause language. Just as
some interpretations of the Free Speech Clause capture the meaning
of that provision better than others, not all approaches to religious
liberty will be equally compatible with the text and the original under-
standing of the religion clauses. 126
C. Professor Smith's Normative Account
Professor Smith emphasizes that he does not intend to suggest
any normative conclusions about church-state relationships. 27 Profes-
sor Smith's reticence is difficult to explain, because his positions lead
inexorably to specific normative conclusions. If the framers did not
agree on any substantive understanding of the religion clauses, and if
all religious liberty theories are predetermined by the varying back-
ground beliefs of particular theorists, "doesn't it follow that courts
should simply get out of the business of protecting religious freedom
altogether ... ?"28 Instead, elected officials would pursue religious
freedom "through compromise, cultivated tolerance, mutual forbear-
ances, and strategic silences."'129
Members of small, unfamiliar religions would be the big losers in
such a scheme. ' 30 While Professor Smith's words have a ringing patri-
126 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Free-
dom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 608 (1996) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 2) (asserting that if
a government engages in religious persecution or religious discrimination "it is behav-
ing unjustly, regardless of what circumstances accompany the discrimination").
127 See SMITH, supra note 2, at vi-vii, 121-22.
128 Id. at 121.
129 Id. at 117.
130 See Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 843 (1996) (reviewing SMITH, supra




otic quality, legislators have a mixed record with respect to noncon-
forming religious groups. Elected officials sometimes have
demonstrated a laudable sensitivity to the needs of nontraditional
religions.131
At other times, however, legislators have entertained blatant big-
otry. The late nineteenth-century persecution of the Church of the
Latter-Day Saints is one of the most embarrassing chapters in Ameri-
can history.132 Congress outlawed the church, and jailed church lead-
ers for violating antipolygamy laws.' 33
In a more recent United States Supreme Court case, Minnesota
legislators enacted burdensome reporting requirements to harass
small religious groups that engaged in extensive solicitation. 34 In Hi-
aleah, Florida, officials persecuted the Santeria religion by enacting
ordinances that prohibited the group's practice of ritual animal sacri-
fices.'35 Even a cursory review of First Amendment doctrine would
have informed the Florida lawmakers that the ordinances were uncon-
stitutional'13 6 The ordinances passed anyway.
131 See SMrrH, supra note 2, at 126; see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990) (noting that a number of state legislatures have enacted statutes that ex-
empt sacramental peyote use from peyote proscriptions); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 608 & n.5 (1961) (noting that a number of states have enacted statutory
exemptions, which excuse a believer who celebrates her Sabbath on a day other than
Sunday from Sunday Closing Laws).
132 See, e.g., JAMES B. ALLEN & GLEN M. LEONARD, THE STORY OF T=E LATER-DAY
SAniN-s 120-34, 211-13, 404-07 (1976) (recounting the persecution of the Mormons
that forced church members to leave Illinois and Missouri); LEONARD J. ARRINGTON &
DAVIs BOroN, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: HISTORY OF THE LATrER-DAY SAiNrs 65-82,
94-95 (1979) (describing the persecution experienced by church members who set-
tied in Nauvoo, Illinois).
133 See, e.g., The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 140 U.S. 665, 665-66 (1891) (upholding the Edmunds-Tucker Act,
which dissolved the Mormon Church and authorized federal seizure of church as-
sets); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878) (refusing to exempt a
Mormon believer from a federal criminal statute that outlawed polygamy); see also
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334-37, 341-48 (1890) (upholding an Idaho statute
imposing criminal penalties on any individual belonging to an organization that
"teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members, devotees or any other person
to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy").
134 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-55 (1982) (invalidating the Minnesota
reporting requirement).
135 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-47
(1993) (invalidating the Hialeah ordinances).
136 All nine Supreme Court justices agreed that the Hialeah ordinances prohibit-
ing ritual animal sacrifices were unconstitutional. Although three justices authored
concurring opinions, two of those opinions did not focus on the ritual sacrifice case.
See id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It]his case turns on a principle about which
1999] 1013
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The inexorable growth of the welfare state's cold bureaucracy
poses a greater danger to small religious groups than these instances
of outright bigotry. More than twenty years ago, ChiefJustice Warren
Burger noted that as government regulations had become "more de-
tailed and pervasive," the small Amish religion had "come into con-
flict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting
a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards."
137
While lawmakers will be careful to respect familiar religious traditions,
they may enact laws that conflict with unfamiliar religious tenets.138
Professor Smith accurately observes that courts have not always
been responsive to the needs of nontraditional religious groups)13 9
For example, the Supreme Court willingly acquiesced in the nine-
teenth-century persecution of the Mormons.
1 40
Nonetheless, members of small religious groups will at least have
greater access to the courts than to elected officials.1 41 Immunized
from worries about reelection and obliged to examine precedent, ap-
pointed judges are more likely than elected officials to consider the
claims of nonconforming religious groups for both pragmatic and in-
stitutional reasons.1 42 In fact, members of small, unfamiliar religious
there is no disagreement"); id, at 577-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I write sepa-
rately to emphasize that the First Amendment's protection of religion extends beyond
those rare occasions on which the government explicitly targets religion (or a particu-
lar religion) for disfavored treatment .... ").
137 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972).
138 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 67, at 253 ("Legislators unfamiliar with a reli-
gious group may pass laws that conflict with the group's tenets."); David E. Steinberg,
Religious Exemptions As Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 116 (1991) (asserting that
legislators may be unaware of conflicts between secular laws and the tenets of small
religious groups and may not be concerned even if they are aware of any such
conflicts).
139 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 126.
140 See cases cited supra note 133.
141 See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 274 ("Legislators seeking re-election or other
elected offices.., have good reason to support exemptions advanced by popular and
influential religions. If legislators ignore exemption claims pressed by small and un-
popular religious groups, the lawmakers need worry little about the political
consequences.").
142 See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV.
91, 108-09 (1991) (stating that without court intervention, majorities "can protect
their own religious preferences while crushing those that they do not share"); Doug-
las Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 15 (stating that unlike
legislators, judges must decide every case brought before them, must treat similar
cases alike, and must give principled reasons for their decisions); Lupu, supra note 29,
at 600-06 (listing a number of institutional characteristics of the judicial branch,




groups have brought the vast majority of Free Exercise Clause cases
heard in the federal courts. 43 This stark pattern indicates that mem-
bers of nontraditional religions anticipate a more sympathetic hearing
from appointed judges than from elected officials.
Nonetheless, if Professor Smith is correct that courts develop reli-
gion clause "principles" only by reference to an arbitrary collection of
"background beliefs,"' 44 judicial withdrawal from this area probably
would be the appropriate course. An absence of judicial decisions is
better than illegitimate decisions. However, the concluding section of
this Book Review suggests some optimism about a principled religion
clause interpretation. Judicial decisions should rely on the principle
of religious choice.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUs CHOICE
The following discussion suggests that the religion clauses were
intended to protect and promote religious choice. The first section
indicates that the principle of religious choice is consistent with the
text and the origins of the First Amendment. The second section
briefly suggests a few consequences of a religion clause interpretation
based on religious choice.
A. The Case for Religious Choice
In seeking to divine the meaning of the First Amendment phrases
"free exercise" of religion and "establishment of religion," a reason-
able starting point is to determine what those words meant to the
framers. Samuel Johnson's influential A Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage listed several definitions of the word "free," including "uncom-
pelled, unrestrained."' 45 To illustrate this use of the term "free,"
Johnson presented the following passage: "It was free, and in my
choice whether or no I should publish these discourses; yet the publi-
cation being resolved, the dedication was not so indifferent.'
46
Other contemporary dictionaries provided similar definitions, which
equated the word "free" with "choice." 47
143 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. Rv.
195, 216 (1992) (observing that "not a single religious exemption claim has ever
reached the Supreme Court from a mainstream Christian religious practitioner").
144 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 67
145 1 SAMUELJOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 9S (1755).
146 Id
147 See, e.g., 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (1775) (defining the word "free" as meaning "[h]aving liberty, uninslaved, in-
dependent, unrestrained"); JAMEs BucHANAN, LINGUAE BrrANIcA VERA
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Among several definitions for the term "exercise," Johnson's dic-
tionary provided the terms "practice; outward performance." 148 John-
son explicitly indicated that religious "exercise" meant religious
practice with the following illustration: "The same prince refused even
those of the church of England, who followed their master to St.
Germain's, the publick exercise of their religion." 149 Other dictionaries
in use as of 1789 similarly defined exercise as referring to "prac-
tice. ' 150 These definitions of "exercise" as "practice or performance"
call into question narrow Free Exercise Clause readings, which assert
that the clause primarily protects religious speech.1 51
In one of several definitions listed for the verb "to establish,"
Johnson uses the following words: "To settle in any privilege or posses-
sion, to confirm." 152 Johnson then provides the following example of
an "establishment of religion": "Soon after the rebellion broke out,
the Presbyterian Sect was established in all its forms by an ordinance of
the lords and commons."'153 James Buchanan's dictionary offered a
more specific definition, reporting that the term "establishment"
meant "Maintenance or Support."'
54
In light of these contemporary definitions, a plausible reading
suggests that the First Amendment was intended to protect religious
choice. The amendment provided that the state could not infringe
religious choices in either of two ways. First, government could not
prohibit the free exercise of religion, which meant that government
could not prevent an individual from choosing a particular religion or
particular religious beliefs. Second, government could not make a law
PRONUNCIATION (1757) (defining the word "free" as meaning "[a]t liberty, not con-
strained"); THOMAS DYCHE, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1740) (defining the
word "free" to mean "to set at Liberty, to quit a person of the Slavery of the Obligation
he was before under; to take off all Restraint").
148 1 JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 8M.
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., I ASH, supra note 147 (stating that among other things, the term "ex-
ercise" means "an act of divine worship, preparatory practice, habitual action");
BUCHANAN, supra note 147 (listing one definition of the verb "to exercise" as "It] o use
or practice"); DYCHE, supra note 147 (defining the verb "to exercise" to mean, among
other things, "[t]o practice or to do a Thing often").
151 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise As
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545, 545-47 (1983) (arguing that the Free Exercise
Clause primarily protects religious expression).
152 1 JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 8H.
153 Id
154 BUCHANAN, supra note 147; see also 1 ASH, supra note 147 (stating that, among
other things, the verb "to establish" means "[t] o settle firmly, to ratify"); DYcHE, supra
note 147 (defining the verb "to establish" to mean "[t]o confirm, appoint, settle, and
do whatever is necessary to make a thing safe, sure, certain, and durable").
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respecting an establishment of religion, which meant that government
could not maintain or support a particular church.
For the advocates of religious liberty in the early years of the
United States, religious liberty meant religious choice. The propo-
nents of the First Amendment religion clauses came from two very
different traditions.1 55 The framers identified with the Enlighten-
ment viewed established churches as impediments to the advance-
ment of science and reason.1 56 In contrast, leaders of the dissenting
evangelical religions sought a more passionate, zealous religion, in
comparison to the bland conformity of the established churches.
The principle of religious choice united the very different En-
lightenment and evangelical proponents of religious liberty.15 7 For
the Enlightenment statesmen, the principle of religious choice of-
fered the hope of reclaiming questions of morality and virtue from
the monopoly of the established churches. For the evangelical reli-
gions, religious choice meant an end to years of government persecu-
tion, designed to maintain the primacy of the established churches. 58
James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, stood at the
crossroads of the Enlightenment and the evangelical traditions. A
product of the Enlightenment, Madison displayed a sympathy for the
plight of the persecuted evangelical religions. 159
155 See, e.g., MARK DEWoLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOvERNMENT IN AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-9 (1965) (comparing En-
lightenment and evangelical approaches to church-state relationships); McConnell,
supra note 27, at 1437 ("To determine the meaning of the religion clauses, it is neces-
sary to see them through the eyes of their proponents, most of whom were members
of the most fervent and evangelical denominations in the nation."); John Witte, Jr.,
The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experimen 71
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 381-85 (1996) (contrasting Enlightenment views on
church-state relations with very different evangelical approaches).
156 See, e.g., Witte, supra note 155, at 384 (stating that Enlightenment views on
church-state issues "were based on a profound skepticism about organized religion
and a profound fear of an autocratic state").
157 See Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold
Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1567, 1581 (1995) ("The proposition that religious beliefs
must be voluntary to be effective was fundamental both to deists, who thought true
religion must follow from the exercise of reason, and to evangelicals, who thought
saving faith could follow only from the moving of the Holy Spirit.").
158 See infra text accompanying notes 174-89 (describing some examples of the
persecution suffered by.members of nonconforming religious groups).
159 See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty,
71 B.U. L. REv. 455, 505 (1991) (stating that although Madison shared "the Enlight-
enment sensibilities ofJohn Locke and Thomas Jefferson," Madison's "overall under-
standing of religious liberty was more expansive than that ofJefferson and Locke");
see also Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 106 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal
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In the first article of his well-known Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, Madison began with a ringing endorse-
ment of religious choice. Madison wrote: "The Religion then of every
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and
it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.' 160 If
any doubt remained that this is what Madison meant by the term "free
exercise of religion," Madison dispelled those doubts when he used
the term explicitly later in his Remonstrance. Madison wrote that all
men are
to be considered as retaining an equal title to the free exercise of
Religion according to the dictates of conscience. Whilst we assert
for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an
equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the
evidence which has convinced us.
161
The seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke was probably
the most influential figure for the Enlightenment statesmen in the
early United States. 162 In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke urged a
"law of toleration," under which all churches would be "obliged to lay
down toleration as the foundation of their liberty; and teach that lib-
erty of conscience is every man's natural right, equally belonging to
dissenters as to themselves; and that no-body ought to be compelled
in matters of religion either by law or force.'
63
Like the American Enlightenment leaders, the leaders of the ev-
angelical religions endorsed the principle of religious choice. In his
essay The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, Virginia Baptist leader John
Leland proclaimed:
Let every man speak freely without fear, maintain the principles that
he believes, worship according to his own faith, either one God,
eds., 1962) (describing the imprisonment of five or six Baptist preachers in Virginia as
an example of "[t]hat diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution").
160 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 183, 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
161 Id. at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 See, e.g., Editorial Note to Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 159, at 297 (stating that Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments indicates "a number of
similarities between the views of JM [Madison] and Locke toward religious ties be-
tween church and state"); Sanford Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedome', 25 J. CHURCH & STATE 231, 232 (1983) (stating that "there
can be little doubt" that Jefferson "derived the principles of religious freedom and
separation of church and state" from John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration).
163 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE
47-48 (1812).
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three Gods, no God, or twenty Gods; and let government protect
him in so doing, i.e., see that he meets with no personal abuse, or
loss of property, for his religious opinions.
1 6 4
Similarly, in proposing a Massachusetts Bill of Rights, Baptist
leader Isaac Backus wrote that because "nothing can be true religion
but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each ra-
tional soul has an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an
unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full
persuasion of his own mind .... ,u65
The principle of religious choice was endorsed in state constitu-
tional provisions enacted during and after the Revolutionary War. By
1789, every state but Connecticut had adopted one of these provi-
sions.166 The constitutional provisions adopted by different states typi-
cally used similar language.16 7 Several state constitutions explicitly
guaranteed the "free exercise" of religion.' 68 However, these state
constitutional provisions often were somewhat more descriptive than
the terse First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ad-
ditional language demonstrates that when the framers used the term
"free exercise of religion," they were referring to the principle of reli-
gious choice.
The early Pennsylvania Constitution contained one of the most
succinct statements of the religious choice principle. The constitution
provided: "That all men have a natural and unalienable right to wor-
ship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
164 John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, in THE WRITINGS oFJoHN LE-
LAND 179, 184 (L. F. Greene ed., 1845).
165 Isaac Backus, A Declaration of Rights, of the Inhabitants of Massachusetts-Bay, in New
England, in IsAAc BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE AND CALVINISM 487 (William G. Mc-
Loughlin ed., 1968).
166 See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1455. Professor McConnell provides a com-
prehensive survey and analysis of the early state constitutional provisions protecting
religious choice. See id. at 1455-66.
167 See id at 1455-56 (noting the similar language found in each of the early state
constitutional provisions that protected religious liberty).
168 See, e.g., GA. CoNsT. of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UN=rED STATES 377,
383 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrru-
TIONs] ("All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion."); N.Y.
CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrrtoNs, supra,
at 1328, 1338 ("[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and wor-
ship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed."); S.C.
CoNsT. of 1789, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITrrbONS, SUpra,
at 1628, 1632-33 (guaranteeing "[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession").
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and understanding."'169 The New Hampshire Constitution endorsed a
similar principle:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship
GOD according to the dictates of his conscience, and reason; and
no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, lib-
erty or estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience.1
70
Professor Smith acknowledges the widespread adoption of state
constitutional provisions that guaranteed the free exercise of religion.
However, he quickly concludes that these provisions did not suggest
any substantive agreement about church-state relationships. 17 1 He
writes: "[W]hile Americans may have concurred in endorsing the slo-
gan 'freedom of conscience,' the agreement was largely verbal."1 72
Professor Smith accurately explains that even where a state consti-
tutional provision guaranteed the free exercise of religion, a state
often would not provide equal treatment to different religious groups.
In the early years of the republic, states typically barred non-Christians
from public office, and often prevented members of some Christian
faiths from holding office. A public disagreement with the prevailing
Christian orthodoxy could result in a blasphemy prosecution. In New
England, individuals could face fines for irregular attendance at Con-
gregational Church services.
1 73
But in focusing on the controversy generated by these outdated
and repressive practices, Professor Smith fails to acknowledge a sub-
stantive consensus that Americans had come to embrace. By the time
of the Constitution, Americans agreed that an individual could choose
her religious beliefs, and that the state could not punish an individual
169 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 168, at 1540, 1541.
170 N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. V, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 168, at 1280, 1281. See also MASS. CONST. of 1780, art II., reprinted in
1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 168, at 956, 957 ("[N]o subject shall
be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God
in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, or for
his religious profession or sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace
or obstruct others in their religious worship."); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, re-
printed in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 168, at 1310, 1313 ("[N]o
person shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of wor-
shipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience;
nor, under any pretense whatever, be compelled to attend any place of worship, con-
trary to his own faith andjudgment .....
171 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 40.
172 Id.
173 See id. at 38.
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for refusing to follow a particular faith. That might not seem like
much. But the toleration of private religious choices was a major de-
parture from the state persecution of religious dissenters, which had
continued until just a few years before the American revolution.
During the colonial period, states imposed a wide variety of pen-
alties on religious dissenters. In 1651, John Clarke, John Crandall,
and Obediah Holmes were arrested in Massachusetts while perform-
ing Baptist religious services. 174 Sympathetic friends paid Clarke's
heavy fine of twenty pounds and Crandall's fine of five pounds.17 5
Holmes would not allow anyone to pay his fine, and he was whipped
in public.
176
Imprisonment was not uncommon for religious dissenters. In
1768, a Spotsylvania, Virginia magistrate imprisoned Baptist preachers
John Waller, Lewis Craig, and James Childs to punish these men for
their religious beliefs.177 Craig served four weeks in jail. Waller and
Childs were imprisoned for eight weeks.' 78 Massachusetts authorities
imprisoned the founders of the First Baptist Church of Boston in
1668, and again in 1670.179
Punishments could be more severe. In 1659, three Quaker wo-
men living in New Hampshire were condemned on account of their
faith. The three women were sentenced to be "whipped from town to
town out of the province."' 80 In 1658, Massachusetts barred all
Quakers from the colony, and prescribed the death penalty for any
Quaker who returned after banishment.' 8 ' Between 1659 and 1661,
at least four Quakers were put to death in Massachusetts. 8 2 After a
skirmish in the 1650s between Puritans and Catholics in Maryland,
174 See WILLiAM WARREN S-wEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 131-32 (1943).
175 See i at 133.
176 See id.
177 See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 112 (1902).
178 See id.; see also William Taylor Thorn, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Virginia:
The Baptists, inJoHNs HoPKINs UNIVERsITY STUDIES IN HisTORY AND PoLrIcAL SC-ENCE
25 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 1900) (stating that between 1768 and 1775, Virginia offi-
cials imprisoned about 34 Baptist preachers).
179 See ALBERT HENRY NEWvMAN, A HISTORY OF ma BAPTIST CHURCHES IN THE
UNITED STATES 178-87 (1894); see also LEONARD W. LEv, THE EsrABLISHmENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND ma FnRsr AMENDMENT 1 (1986) (noting that in 1774, eighteen Baptists
from Warwick, Massachusetts were jailed because they had not paid an assessment
that supported the town's Congregational minister); ROBERT B. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF
THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE BAPTISTs IN VIRGINIA 32-33 (G.W. Beale ed., 1894) (in
December 1770, Baptist preachers William Webber and Joseph Anthony both were
imprisoned in Virginia for about three months).
180 COBB, supra note 177, at 293.
181 See SWEET, supra note 174, at 146.
182 See id. at 146-47.
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four Catholics were hanged and Jesuit priests fled from Maryland to
Virginia.183
In addition, colonies both banished dissenters and prohibited dis-
senters from entering. In 1644, Massachusetts banished all Baptists.' 8 4
In 1700, a New York statute banished all Catholic priests "under pain
of perpetual imprisonment."' 8 5 Under a 1659 Virginia law, any
Quaker entering Virginia was to be arrested, imprisoned, and ex-
iled.186 Further, any shipmaster who brought a Quaker to Virginia
would be fined 100 pounds187
Religious persecutions were not limited to the earliest days of the
American colonies. The Virginia imprisonment of Baptist preachers
John Waller, Lewis Craig, and James Childs occurred less than ten
years before the Revolutionary War.188 In 1756, Maryland imposed
double taxation on Catholics living in the colony.
189
But at about the time of the Revolutionary War, Americans in all
states renounced the practice of punishing religious dissidents and
proscribing private religious choices. Although members of dissent-
ing sects were not guaranteed equal treatment with respect to suf-
frage, holding public office, or other benefits of citizenship, these
individuals could practice their religions in peace. As one of the lead-
ing chronicles on America's early religious history describes the new
approach: "All states agreed with [Thomas] Jefferson that civil govern-
ment could interfere when 'principles break out into overt acts
against peace & good order' but otherwise, citizens had a right to
practice the religions of their choice, even the hated Catholicism,
which had been proscribed in colonial America."' 90 Other scholars
offer similar descriptions of the American consensus on church-state
relations at the time of the Constitution.' 9 '
183 See id. at 179.
184 See CuRRY, supra note 59, at 13.
185 Id. at 71.
186 See COBB, supra note 177, at 90.
187 See id.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
189 See CuRRY, supra note 59, at 80.
190 Id. at 219.
191 See WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTuRE OF AMERICAN DE-
MocRAcv 30 (1985) (stating that the religion clauses of the First Amendment estab-
lished that the federal government "must protect the rights of conscience, or the right
of every man to believe what he will"); MORTON BORDEN, JEws, TuRKS, AND INFIDELS 5
(1984) ("By 1788,Jews had, in a word, achieved toleration in the United States. None
of the state governments threatened the 'free' exercise of religion."); GERARD V. BRAD-
LEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 55 (1987) (stating that by 1789,
"[d] irect compelled subvention of a sect other than one's own was an idea whose time
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Contrary to Professor Smith's contention, the framers of the Con-
stitution had found some common ground on church-state issues.
The framers and other Americans agreed on the principle of religious
choice.19 2 The language of the First Amendment religion clauses and
state constitutional provisions attempted to establish this principle as
a matter of constitutional law.
B. Application of the Religious Choice Principle
An interpretation of the First Amendment religion clauses based
on the principle of religious choice would include two components.
First, legislation that attempted to increase religious choices would be
presumptively valid. Second, government could not take action that
would distort or limit private religious choices without some good
reason.
Under this approach, the religious choice principle would re-
place both current Free Exercise Clause doctrine and Establishment
Clause doctrine. Today, a law violates the Free Exercise Clause only if
it is not "generally applicable," and is enacted to discriminate against
some or all religions. 193 In the more common situation where a law
imposes a disproportionate impact on members of a particular reli-
gion, believers cannot establish a Free Exercise Clause violation. 19 4
Although Establishment Clause law is somewhat more uncertain, most
had passed"); Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of
Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. Ry. 674, 722
(1987) ("Free exercise gave all believers the right to actually believe and worship as
they pleased. A good cognate term is the one found in several state constitutions,
protecting against 'molestation' on account of belief.").
192 Professor Thomas Berg has endorsed a similar approach to the First Amend-
ment religion clauses. Under Professor Berg's "voluntarism" principle, "government
should, as much as possible, minimize the effect it has on the voluntary, independent
religious decisions of the people as individuals and in voluntary groups." Berg, supra
note 33, at 703-04. Professor Berg derives his voluntarism principle in part from
historical evidence. See id. at 708-11.
For another similar reading of the religion clauses, see Douglas Laycock, Forma4
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 993, 1001
(1990) (advocating that "the religion clauses require government to minimize the
extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, prac-
tice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance").
193 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990).
194 In such cases, believers could bring a Free Exercise Clause action prior to
Smith. On the changes in Free Exercise Clause law that resulted from the Smith deci-
sion, see generally Steinberg, supra note 67, at 246-52.
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cases begin with a three-part test first stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.1 95
This Book Review suggests that both Free Exercise Clause law and Es-
tablishment Clause law should be replaced with a single doctrine
based on religious choice.
Recall the hypothetical Michigan statute that exempted Amish
believers like Jerry Swartzentruber from a state highway safety law,
which required that any slow-moving vehicle must display a bright or-
ange reflector. 196 Courts and commentators sometimes have viewed
such statutory exemptions with suspicion.1 97 Such statutes do not
treat religious and secular objections in the same way. Instead, these
statutes exempt only religious believers from the requirements of a
law.
If the religion clauses enacted the principle of religious choice
instead of the principle of neutrality, the focus changes. The Michi-
gan exemption increases the choices available to Swartzentruber. He
no longer must decide between violating an Amish principle, and vio-
lating a state law.
Under the religious choice principle, a statute that attempted to
increase religious choices would be invalid only if the law violated a
legal principle independent of the religion clauses. For example, as-
195 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test provides: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion... finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
Commentators frequently have criticized the Lemon test. See, e.g., Jesse H.
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 673, 680 (1980) ("ITlhe Court's three-prong [Lemon] test has generated ad
hoc judgments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis.");
Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 18 (1978-79) ("[T]he three-
prong [Lemon] test has resulted in as much confusion and conflict under the estab-
lishment clause as the Court's decisions under the free exercise clause."); see also
David E. Steinberg, Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 Ky. L.J. 691, 692 (1991-92) (assert-
ing that the Supreme Court should at least abandon the entanglement portion of the
Lemon test).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
197 See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 705-11 (1985) (con-
cluding that Connecticut had violated the Establishment Clause where a Connecticut
statute provided that no employee could be required to work on his Sabbath); Kur-
land, supra note 195, at 16-18 (opposing both court-mandated religious exemptions
and statutory exemptions); Lupu, supra note 29, at 599-606 (arguing that courts
should be able to mandate religious exemptions, but that courts typically should not
permit statutory religious exemptions adopted by legislators). But cf Smith, 494 U.S.
at 890 (holding that statutory religious exemptions often will be permissible, but
courts in most cases may not mandate religious exemptions).
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sume that Congress adopted a modest tax exemption for private
schools and allowed sectarian schools that practiced racial segregation
to rely on the exemption. Making such an exemption available to dis-
criminatory private schools might be unconstitutional, because the ex-
emption would conflict with the antidiscrimination principle of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.198 But with
the exception of laws that raised problems extrinsic to the religion
clauses, government statutes expanding religious choices would be
constitutional. 199
As a second component of a religion clause interpretation based
on religious choice, a government could not enforce legislation that
limited or distorted private religious choices unless the government
possessed some good reason for the prohibition.200 The Free Exercise
Clause cases that seem most compelling involve situations where a,
government proscribed a religious practice without an adequate
explanation.
For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,201 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a series of
Hialeah, Florida ordinances that prohibited the ritual sacrifice of ani-
mals. According to the city, these ordinances prevented members of
198 Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (upholding
an Internal Revenue Service ruling, which concluded that a tax exemption for private
schools did not apply to schools practicing racial discrimination).
199 Cf Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLuM. L.
REv. 1, 59 (1996) ("[A]s with racial affirmative action, religious accommodation is a
matter on which courts should intervene cautiously, in limited circumstances.").
200 Prior to 1990, where a law conflicted with sincerely held religious beliefs, a
court would mandate a free exercise exemption unless the state demonstrated that
denying an exemption claim would serve a "compelling state interest." See, e.g., Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (holding that in opposing a free exercise
exemption from an unemployment compensation rule, South Carolina had not
demonstrated that denying an exemption would serve a compelling state interest).
Recent cases have expressed deep skepticism about whether the compelling interest
test is appropriate for Free Exercise Clause cases. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 65
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
concluding that the compelling interest test "reflects a lack of proportionality or con-
gruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved"); Smith,
494 U.S. at 888 (applying the compelling interest test in Free Exercise Clause cases
"would be coui-ting anarchy").
I intentionally have declined to specify the state's burden of justification when
the state seeks to enforce a law that limits or distorts private religious choices. My
point here simply is that the state should be required to justify the enforcement of
such a law. In many situations, current doctrine does not require the state to demon-
strate any meaningful justification.
201 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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the Santeria religion from inflicting cruel treatment on animals.202
However, the city allowed the killing of animals in several other activi-
ties that seemed at least as cruel as the ritual sacrifices. These prac-
tices included hunting, fishing, scientific experiments on animals, and
the extermination of pests.203 If the city did not view the prevention
of cruelty to animals as an overriding consideration in these other
contexts, then this policy also did not support the prohibition on rit-
ual sacrifices.
20 4
In the more controversial Employment Division v. Smith,205 the
United States Supreme Court held that Oregon need not exempt Na-
tive American believers from a state law prohibiting possession of pe-
yote. Peyote is a sacrament used in Native-American Church rituals.
The Smith decision was so unpopular that Congress attempted to cir-
cumvent the case with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.20 6 In
1997, the Supreme Court held that the act was unconstitutional. 20 7
Smith captured public attention to a greater extent than other
unsuccessful Free Exercise Clause challenges, 208 perhaps because the
state provided only a weak justification for the law proscribing a reli-
gious ritual. According to the State of Oregon, the peyote prohibition
served the state's interest in preventing the distribution of illicit
drugs.209 However, the state failed to demonstrate that peyote use
raised any greater evils than the use of sacramental wine in Catholic
services. 210 The state produced no evidence suggesting that peyote
202 See id at 543 (discussing the city's interest in "preventing cruelty to animals").
203 See id. at 543-44 (listing a number of circumstances where Florida law author-
ized the killing of animals).
204 See id. at 544 (stating that the City of Hialeah did not explain "why religion
alone must bear the burden of the ordinances, when many of these secular killings
fall within the city's interest in preventing the cruel treatment of animals").
205 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
206 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
207 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-71 (1997).
208 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-53 (1987) (holding
that two prison work rules did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though the
rules prevented Muslim inmates from celebrating a weekly religious service on Friday
afternoons); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-10 (1986) (refusing to man-
date that the United States Air Force must exempt an Orthodox Jewish officer from
an Air Force regulation that prohibited personnel from wearing headgear indoors,
even though the officer's religion required that he wear a yarmulke).
209 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Oregon's criminal pro-
hibition represents that State's judgment that the possession and use of controlled
substances, even by only one person, is inherently harmful and dangerous.").
210 See, e.g., EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: THE DIVINE CACTUS 186-87 (2d ed.
1996) (describing a study, which concluded that alcohol was 21 times more addictive
than peyote); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 3 (1987) ("Peyote is not
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was dangerous, addictive, 21 ' or regularly used as a recreational
drug.2 12 Absent evidence that the peyote ritual resulted in any genu-
ine harm, the Supreme Court should have protected private religious
choices by mandating an exemption from the Oregon law.213
I do not mean to suggest that the religious choice principle will
make law-and-religion cases easy to decide, with judges applying some
mechanical formula. Identifying laws that actually limit or distort reli-
gious choices may prove difficult. No simple equation will determine
when genuine religious needs must give way to an overriding state
policy. For example, after surveying the state and religious interests
summarized above, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor voted to deny the
court-mandated exemption sought by the Native American believers
in Employment Division v. Smith.214 Justice O'Connor's balancing of the
state and private interests led to a different decision than the result
advocated in this Book Review.
However, the religious choice principle attempts to identify the
ideals that resulted in the religion clauses. Religion clause law will
begin to make sense only when courts seek out the principles that led
the framers to enact the clauses in the first place.
habit-forming, and in the controlled ambiance of a peyote meeting it is in no way
harmful.").
211 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 911-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that Oregon
offers "no evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone").
212 See id. at 916 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("Peyote simply is not a popular drug;
its distribution for use in religious rituals has nothing to do with the vast and violent
traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country.").
213 Admittedly, the writings of the influential British philosopherJohn Locke re-
jected free exercise exemptions, such as the exemption sought by the Smith claimants.
See Locke, supra note 163, at 43 (concluding that "the private judgment of any person
concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does not take away
the obligation of that law, nor.deserve a dispensation"). Professor Michael McCon-
nell has argued that Locke rejected mandatory exemptions because he could not have
contemplated the institution of judicial review, where a court could weigh secular
interests against religious commitments. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1444
("Locke's key assumption of legislative supremacy no longer holds under a written
constitution with judicial review.").
Alternatively, Locke may have concluded that an argument for exemptions based
on religious belief would be dismissed as an absurdity. At the time when Locke con-
demned persecutions of religious dissenters, Locke's argument for simple toleration
was quite controversial. Locke may have worried that if he embraced religious ex-
emptions from otherwise valid laws, his argument for toleration would seem radical
and would lose all credibility.
214 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C. Professor Smith's Response
Professor Smith's insightful response to this Book Review focuses
on the "genre" that includes my essay-"historical constitutional
scholarship." 215 To be sure, Professor Smith clearly disagrees with
some of my conclusions about the framers' intentions. 21 6 But his re-
sponse seems more concerned with the method that I have used than
the results of that method.
In particular, Professor Smith views historical constitutional
scholarship as driven by a need to derive some principle "that can be
applied by courts to produce results that are attractive under current
views and values." 217 The need to obtain a principle causes legal
scholars to distort the historical record, although the scholar has no
intention of distorting history and probably will be unconscious of any
such distortion. Professor Smith writes:
Tacit presumptions work their way into the [historical] enterprise.
Standards of proof are accordingly relaxed-or conversely, for
scholarship that subverts an attractive story or principle, tightened
.... The familiar "level of generality" phenomenon is exploited to
craft grand principles that can be attributed to framers Who are not
in any position to protest.
218
I was a bit surprised by Professor Smith's criticism of historical
constitutional scholarship. Much of Foreordained Failure is devoted to
this sort of reasoning. While I rely on historical materials to assert
that the religion clauses implemented the religious choice principle,
Foreordained Failure relies on historical materials to assert that the
clauses were purely jurisdictional.21 9 If my "story" of the religious
choice principle is problematic because I have used historical consti-
tutional scholarship to develop this story, then Professor Smith's story
of the jurisdictional principle is similarly suspect.
But Professor Smith's concerns about historical constitutional
scholarship carry an undeniable ring of truth. The development of
constitutional principles inherently involves generalizing about, and
thus simplifying, history. Historical events are often complex, messy,
and cannot be summarized completely into a neat principle-much
less a one-sentence principle. As Professor Smith accurately notes in
215 Smith, supra note 47, at 1.
216 See id. at 6-19.
217 Id. at 2.
218 Id. at 2-3.
219 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 17-54.
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Foreordained Failure, the framers approached religious liberty issues
from different perspectives and with different goals.
220
Therefore, the most accurate summary of the framers' intent with
respect to church-state issues might be something like the following:
"The religion clauses of the First Amendment resulted from a variety
of different views about federal-state relations, church-state relations,
and religious liberty." Why not just leave it at that?
Such a statement is unsatisfactory because American courts and
legislators attempt to make law based on principles derived from a
variety of evidence. Interpretation is an essential part of legal reason-
ing, regardless of whether a lawmaker bases her decision on the
United States Constitution, on an antitrust statute that is more than
one hundred years old,22 1 on common law principles that date back to
medieval England, on social science evidence, or simply on sound
public policy.
The alternative would be to treat legal decisions as purely discre-
tionary. Lawmakers would reach decisions based simply on their good
judgment, and would not attempt to justify their decisions by resort to
some principle. At least with respect to religious freedom, Professor
Smith seems comfortable with significant legislative discretion.222
However, a purely discretionary approach to lawmaking is largely
alien to our society, as reflected in our Constitution. Consider the
following laws that legislators might enact because they seemed sensi-
ble. One such law might prohibit any religious rituals that were incon-
sistent with the public good.223 A second law would allow police to
conduct a search for evidence whenever officers thought that a search
was appropriate. A third law would impose criminal punishment on a
particular individual because she had used offensive language one
month ago, even though no law had proscribed the woman's conduct
at that time.
220 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 19-21.
221 The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
222 See SMrH, supra note 2, at 117.
223 The possibility that officials actually might enact such a law is not as far-fetched
as initially might seem to be the case. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-47 (1993) (invalidating a municipal ordinance
that sought to prohibit a religious group from practicing ritual animal sacrifices);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-90 (1990) (upholding an Oregon law
that imposed criminal penalties for the possession of peyote, even when believers
used this hallucinogenic cactus in Native American religious rituals); see also supra text
accompanying notes 132-33 (describing federal attempts to abolish the Church of
Latter-Day Saints in the nineteenth century) -
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An initial response to these sort of discretionary judgments is that
the hypothetical laws violate the original understanding of particular
constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment religion
clauses,224 the Fourth Amendment,225 and the ex post facto clause.
226
A more fundamental concern is that this sort of ad hoc discretionary
decisionmaking seems at odds with a constitutional premise that offi-
cials will reach decisions based on principles. The premise appears in
the language of the Due Process Clause,227 the Equal Protection
Clause, 228 and even the Ninth Amendment mandate that "the
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights ...shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
'229
If one insists that constitutional interpretation requires a refer-
ence to principle, then historical evidence is an attractive method for
deriving such principles. Historical evidence is simply less susceptible
than most other forms of constitutional reasoning to the sort of ma-
nipulation that Professor Smith fears. One might make a good social
science argument that the United States Constitution should forbid all
religious meetings-or at least Karl Marx seemed to think that such
an argument was plausible. 230 But the history of the First Amendment
simply does not support such an interpretation of the framers'
intentions.
Even though I disagree with Professor Smith about the intent ex-
pressed by the framers in the First Amendment, our disagreement is
relatively modest. Arguments based on historical fact simply are not
susceptible to the same degree of manipulation and indefiniteness as
arguments based on a social science hypothesis. If a lawmaker must
base constitutional decisions on principled reasons, then historical re-
search is an attractive method for finding plausible principles.
224 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures").
226 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed").
227 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that neither the federal
government nor a state may take a person's life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law).
228 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that no state may "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
229 U.S. CONsT. amend. IX (emphasis added).
230 In a frequently quoted passage, Karl Marx described religion as "the opiate of
the masses." KARL MARX, INTRODUcTION TO A CRITIQUE OF THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT (1844).
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CONCLUSION
Simply invoking the word "choice" will not resolve all of the com-
plex issues relating to religious freedom. Maybe religious choice isn't
even the right principle. Nonetheless, the religion clauses enacted
some substantive principle or set of principles. The clauses were not
adopted simply to leave questions of religion to the states, or to the
discretion of elected officials.
Courts are like ghosts-they have no life unless you believe in
them. Argue convincingly that courts are capable of only arbitrary,
subjective, and unprincipled decisions, and that's what courts are
likely to give you. Suggest a principled approach, and courts might
surprise you.
